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 THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS 
Margaret Raymond*
The discussion of training reflected in this conference largely addresses 
how, in the current climate, we can turn new law graduates into 
experienced, capable and competent lawyers.  My particular interest is in 
the importance of teaching law graduates to be ethical lawyers.
 
1
This development is consistent with the move to specialization in the 
profession as a whole.  Specialization unquestionably has its benefits.  The 
job of ethics advising and professional responsibility decision-making has, 
through professionalization, been situated somewhere, with a clear set of 
responsible persons.  Nonetheless, these trends are a concern because 
ethical responsibility cannot be fully delegated.  Lawyers can and should 
turn to ethics specialists to assist with complex issues, but the radar 
required to spot those issues and the awareness that consultation is 
necessary are nondelegable skills.  It is certainly possible to view ethics as 
a complex legal discipline, getting—as most disciplines are—more 
complicated with the passage of time.  Mastering vast networks of 
regulation, a burgeoning body of precedent, and voluminous scholarly 
commentary makes expertise in any area demanding and difficult.  In this, 
ethics is surely not unique.  Yet, all lawyers have a commitment to follow 
their professional responsibility obligations.  They cannot decline expertise 
  I start 
with a provocative hypothesis: that the current versions of our ethical rules 
and the structure of law firms have the potential to encourage the 
professionalization of ethics rather than connecting all practitioners to the 
values of professional responsibility. 
 
*Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.  Thanks to Gerald Wetlaufer for helpful 
suggestions, to the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics for the invitation to participate in 
this Conference, and to Cynthia Lohman and Justin McCarty for excellent legal research 
assistance. 
 1. The term “legal ethics” is subject to some critique.  See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, 
The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a 
Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 
441 (2005) (arguing that the phrase “legal ethics” is improper because rules of professional 
responsibility deal with professional regulation rather than “ethics”).  As is commonly done, 
I will use the term Alegal ethics” to reflect compliance with professional responsibility 
standards for attorneys, recognizing that it is distinct from “ethics” in a philosophical or 
moral sense. 
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in this area in the same way they can pass on other substantive issues—tax, 
or ERISA, or environmental law—which they know they lack the 
expertise, and perhaps the interest, to handle competently.2
This Article sets out the factors that contribute to the increased 
professionalization of professional responsibility in large law firms.  It 
argues that we should rethink the ever-growing, elaborate and exegetical 
texture of ethics rules, and that a version of the professional responsibility 
rules, more accessible to the ordinary, non-expert practitioner, would be a 
valuable contribution. 
  Telling 
pressured and overwhelmed lawyers that this area is, in effect, way too 
complex for them to master may cause them to lack ownership of ethics 
principles. 
I start with three premises: that new lawyers find themselves in an 
environment where independent performance at top speed is at a premium, 
that specialization is a paramount value, and that the rules of legal ethics 
are getting more and more complex and elaborate.  This combination 
makes it extremely difficult for new lawyers to think of ethics issues as 
matters for which they can take responsibility.  Instead, it becomes a matter 
for the “professionals”—ethics experts within the law firms.  While the 
development of an institutional infrastructure of expertise is undoubtedly 
beneficial, we need to consider carefully how to maintain the connection of 
new lawyers to their own ethical responsibilities. 
In her paper, Professor Elizabeth Chambliss accuses me of the “nirvana 
fallacy”—of rejecting approaches to ethics decision-making in favor of a 
failed and nostalgic ideal of collegial decision-making and individual 
accountability.  I share Professor Chambliss’s skepticism about false 
nostalgia for the nonexistent golden era of lawyering, and have articulated 
similar critiques elsewhere.3
 
 2. These problems of specialization resemble the ethics problem in that the lawyer 
consulting a specialist needs to know just enough to see that the expert’s counsel is 
necessary.  Developing and maintaining that sensitivity is critical in the current culture of 
professionalization.  See infra notes 
  More significantly, I think Professor 
35-36 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Margaret Raymond, Criminal Defense Heroes, 13 WIDENER L.J. 167, 167-68 
(2003) (noting that “I am a little concerned that we are unduly glorifying the past, convinced 
that the olden days represented some now-bygone era of courageous, committed 
lawyering . . . .  I am always a little skeptical of those who wax nostalgic for the old days of 
lawyering, when a lawyer’s word was his bond and when common ground and common 
backgrounds obviated the need for civility codes.  Those were also the days when 
advertising and solicitation restrictions were wielded aggressively to keep immigrant 
lawyers from developing practices; when persons of color were restricted from attending 
public law schools; and when women, trained as lawyers, were offered positions as 
secretaries, evidently because they lacked the one necessary accoutrement for the practice of 
law.”) 
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Chambliss posits a false dichotomy between bureaucratized systems and 
individual accountability.  Contrary to her assertions, I do not condemn the 
creation of ethics infrastructure—far from it. Yet ethics infrastructure 
functions—and its proponents recognize that it functions—only when it 
harmonizes effectively with individual ethics awareness and accountability.  
In view of Professor Chambliss’s recognition that even firms with some 
ethics infrastructure provide little guidance to their lawyers on a range of 
issues, including proper billing practices, investments in clients, and 
control of client funds, the need for individual accountability even in a firm 
with ethics infrastructure remains evident. 
Ultimately, Professor Chambliss agrees.  She suggests that the true value 
of compliance specialists is not that, in some “legalistic” fashion, they will 
increase fear of enforcement and therefore compliance.  Instead, using an 
“institutional” model of regulation, the existence of compliance specialists 
will alter the norms of firm culture, enabling specialists to play a role “in 
educating and socializing firm members.”  The goal of educating and 
socializing firm members is, ultimately, an increase in individual 
accountability.  My suggestion in this paper is only that the creation of 
ethics specialists in an increasingly complex and highly regulated ethics 
environment may pose some challenges to the continuing goal of individual 
ethics awareness and accountability.  On the need to maintain such 
awareness and accountability, I would be surprised if we disagree. 
I.  THE NEED FOR SPEED 
The first development that affects this situation is the newly developed 
expectation that lawyers are constantly accessible and available around the 
clock, and that they will speedily respond to any inquiry from a superior or 
client.  The most ubiquitous comment from lawyers participating in the 
conference concerned these expectations of constant access and speedy 
response. 
This development is in part the product of new technologies.  
Cellphones, Blackberries, and wireless communications have created “a 
world of invisibility and speed,”4 where “new habits of thought . . . emerge 
from the compression of time and space and the expectation that everyone 
should be available all the time.”5
 
 4. Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, Respond Now! E-mail, Acceleration, and a Pedagogy of 
Patience, in PEDAGOGY: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO TEACHING LITERATURE, LANGUAGE, 
COMPOSITION AND CULTURE, Vol. 4, No. 3, 365 (2004). 
  The existence of these technologies 
creates the potential for new expectations: that lawyers will be instantly 
 5. Id. at 366. 
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accessible and responsive to clients or superiors on an around-the-clock 
basis.6
This expectation is not simply the product of technology, but a reflection 
of an increasingly competitive environment for business development.
 
7  
While technology facilitates continuous access and availability, the need to 
provide superior client service drives the notion that such access and 
availability is a critical component of doing the job.8  A firm not providing 
real-time responsive service to its clients around the clock runs the risk of 
losing those clients to a firm that will;9 the ability to respond quickly, and 
to be accessible on demand, thus becomes an obligation to do so.10
So one factor we have to take into account is that young lawyers are 
expected to move fast, and to be accessible and responsive around the 
clock.  This means two things for those new lawyers.  First, the need to 
show that you can and will produce an answer on a short timeline reduces 
the time you have to contemplate a complex issue.  Responsiveness is 
assessed on a different timetable, one which might not allow the kind of 
 
 
 6. See, e.g., Ross E. Davies, Learning from Laptops, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 29 
(“Standard equipment for your average associate these days includes a laptop and a 
BlackBerry . . . .  These technological wonders endow the associate with unprecedented 
flexibility to get work done and stay in touch with the office without having to be there.  
This works well for the associate—who can, for example, work at home sometimes and save 
commuting time.  And it works well for the law firm—which can, for example, contact a 
vacationing associate in the beach via BlackBerry with an emergency assignment for her to 
complete using her convenient laptop.”). 
 7. See Angela West, Meeting Demands With Technology, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 22, 2004, 
at S1.  West notes that “[t]oday’s legal clients are looking for a law firm that has a solid 
technology infrastructure and knows how to use technology in order to guarantee excellent 
customer service,” and that “[h]ow firms keep clients happy through technology will 
continue to play a key role in effective business development.”  Id.  Important technology 
includes “handheld wireless devices as a tool for 24/7 access.”  Id.  Further, “[w]ith the 
nature of international business running on a 24/7 basis, the development of devices that 
give clients instant access to their legal counsel will also remain important.”  Id. 
 8. See Anthony Paonita, Look, Ma, No Wires, CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2004, at 69 
(describing how one general counsel’s relationship with his outside counsel changed when 
he switched to a BlackBerry: “He used to engage in unproductive voicemail duels, but now 
he can email outside counsel and they respond quickly.  ‘You can get [the answer] you want 
when you want it.’”). 
 9. See Carol L. Schlein, What Every Firm Needs, N.J. LAW., May 5, 2003 at 8 (“As 
technology has matured, it has put increasing demands on legal professionals. [C]ell phones, 
Blackberries and remote access to e-mail have elevated client expectations.  Lawyers must 
master these tools to meet these expectations.”). 
 10. I remember being amazed in 1987 that, through the use of the fax machine, we could 
effectively serve our Australian clients around the clock: what I faxed off at the close of 
business on our day was faxed back to us with changes and suggestions by the time I got to 
the office the next morning.  That brave new world has advanced extraordinarily; the 
twenty-four hour workday—even without the benefit of time difference—has become the 
expectation. 
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mature reflection most of us would view as important in the development 
of an ethical sensibility.11
II.  THE PRESSURE TO SPECIALIZE 
  Second, the need to respond quickly adds to the 
pressure to specialize. 
Even new lawyers are encouraged, early on, to become experts in 
something. Professional development literature urges specialization as a 
formula for success.12  It is not enough, as a young lawyer, to work hard at 
the assignments you are given and develop the skills of a generalist.13  
Specialization is touted as a way to develop expertise, stand out from the 
crowd, and do an effective job of marketing yourself.14 Specialization is 
urged by insurers as well,15 and this trend towards specialization is 
reflected across the profession.16
 
 11. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 717 (1998) (noting that “Everyone in the firm feels 
the pressures of overburdened time and the need to make snap decisions on insufficient 
sleep and reflection: ‘There’s too much to do and no time to think,’ and in any case there is 
no standard billing category for such things as ‘Time for consultation and deliberation on 
ethical issues.’”). 
  The pressure to move quickly only 
 12. See, e.g., Ward Bower, Ten Action Steps for More Profitable, Productive Practices, 
L. PRAC. MGMT., April 1999, at 30 (“In today’s economy, no one wants a generalist to 
handle their problem; everyone wants a specialist.  A specialist almost always wins against a 
generalist.  Large-firm lawyers learned this long ago.  Solos and lawyers in small firms also 
should specialize . . . .”); Ezra Tom Clark, Jr., Characteristics of Successful Law Firms, 24 
L. PRAC. MGMT. 40 (1998) (“Successful law firms must have a focus or raison d’etre, and 
each lawyer should develop specialized expertise consistent with the firm’s mission.”). 
 13. Noted one commencement speaker, “[L]awyers have not traditionally sought to 
specialize in any one aspect of the law. Indeed, once you have passed the bar exam . . . you 
are officially deemed capable of doing almost any legal work . . . .  You may, 
understandably, be reluctant to orchestrate the merger between Time Warner and AOL 
without some help. Luckily for you, Time Warner and AOL are likely to be equally as 
reluctant to have you do so . . . .  Increasingly, corporations and other clients are demanding 
that their lawyers be specialists in the areas for which they are hired . . . .  Law firms and 
lawyers throughout the country are responding to these client demands.”  Hon. Lee R. West, 
Oklahoma City University Law School May 11, 2003 Commencement Address, 29 OKLA. 
CITY U.L. REV. 453, 457 (2004). 
 14. William J. Wernz, The Ethics of Large Law Firms: Responses and Reflections, 16 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 187 (2002) (“Prominent among the assets of large firms is highly 
specialized knowledge . . . . Because much specialized knowledge is highly technical and 
concerns issues that appear amoral, there is an understandable tendency for the lawyer-
specialist to think of himself as a technician.”). 
 15. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 199 (2002) (noting 
the importance of specialization and that “dabblers will pay a price” in the insurance arena). 
 16. Ted Schneyer, The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 521, 523 (2002) (“American lawyers are becoming ever more specialized.  Many now 
practice in one narrowly defined field of law and serve a very limited clientele.”).  Even 
small firms and solo practitioners tend towards specialization.  Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical 
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increases this tendency, since specialized knowledge facilitates speedy 
response.  The need to specialize has extended to the area of professional 
responsibility.  Many firms are creating a culture of expertise in ethics,17 
developing a structure of internal “ethics compliance specialists.”18  The 
creation of varied patterns of “ethical infrastructure”19 in law firms is good 
news.  While these structures involve a range of titles, responsibilities, and 
authority,20 they reflect that firms are recognizing the need to focus on and 
attend to ethics issues.21  They also create an internal resource and, one 
hopes, an internal culture of ethics consultation and reflection.  It is a 
significant positive development that there are particular individuals in the 
firms who view these issues as their responsibility.  Firms which in the past 
lacked a clear structure for internal ethics advice, direction and expertise 
reflected both a lack of concern and a lack of competence which created the 
potential for a wholly inadequate response to ethics concerns.22
 
World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 316, 325-27 
(2004). 
 
 17. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical 
Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
691, 692 (2002) (noting that “anecdotal evidence suggests that large law firms increasingly 
rely on in-house ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and other internal specialists to 
manage the firm’s compliance with ethics and malpractice regulation”); see also Elizabeth 
Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 335, 346 (2003) (hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, New Framework) (noting 
that “large law firms increasingly are turning to in-house specialists to manage the firm’s 
compliance with professional regulation”). 
 18. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
559, 565 (2002) (hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role)  (reflecting the fact that 
such specialists have widely varying titles and responsibilities). 
 19. See Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the 
“Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998). 
 20. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 
15, at 199 (describing Winston and Strawn’s “conflict of interest” monitoring mechanism, 
which involves a partner, two part-time lawyers and thirteen college graduates).  Baker and 
McKenzie described a nine-person professional responsibility committee and a full-time 
director of professional responsibility.  Id. 
 21. Chambliss and Wilkins argue for requiring law firms to designate compliance 
specialists to “increas[e] firms’ accountability for structural controls,”  Chambliss & 
Wilkins, New Framework, supra note 17, at 349, and to “increas[e] the authority and 
effectiveness of specialists within firms.”  Id. 
 22. See, e.g., Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 565 (One of the 
lawyers interviewed for the Chambliss & Wilkins study commented, “[W]hen I joined the 
firm 20 years ago, there was a senior partner with a copy of the Model Code in his office 
and that was the ethics department.”); see also Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: 
The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 859 
(1998) (describing the following comment from an associate’: “I’ve worked at two firms, 
and I think that in both firms, certainly, you would be encouraged to bring anything that you 
felt was a clear problem to the right place—although, quite frankly, I couldn’t tell you what 
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The motivation behind this development is multifaceted.  In part, it 
reflects concerns about liability; appropriate infrastructure assures insurers 
that a compliance system is in place.23
It may reflect a desire to provide for a separate “ethics counsel” for 
confidentiality or privilege purposes, to create a climate of awareness, to 
play a preventive role in avoiding ethics problems,
 
24 or to seek to build 
trust so that lawyers in the firm will be more likely to approach the 
designated person for ethics advice.  It also reflects the increasing 
complexity of legal ethics as a substantive discipline,25 whose disregard has 
a significant downside potential for the firms.26
But the internal focus on ethics specialists also suggests that ethics is 
just another area of specialization, one in which someone else is developing 
expertise so you don’t have to.
 
27  This runs the risk of shuttling the 
consideration of ethics to the designated individuals, taking ethical issues 
out of mainstream discourse.28
 
the right place was, in either one of those firms, because they didn’t designate anyone in 
particular, to my knowledge.”). 
  Moreover, except in a specialized practice 
 23. See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 
15, at 135 (discussing National Conference on Legal Malpractice and Risk Management and 
noting that “[i]nsurers play a major role in insuring that law firms have systems in place”); 
Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 559-60; see also Weinstock, supra 
note 4 (noting that ALAS, the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society, “has played an 
important role in promoting the formal appointment of in-house compliance specialists”). 
 24. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 560 (“proponents argue 
that in-house specialists may play an important preventive role by increasing firm-wide 
awareness of ethics and regulatory issues”). 
 25. See Karen Donovan, When Big Law Firms Trip Over Their Own Clients, N.Y. 
TIMES, October 3, 2004, at 5 (quoting Stephen Gillers as saying “‘I’ve seen the doctrines 
become increasingly complex and almost inscrutable, and that’s why lawyers need lawyers 
to help them stay safe.’”); Chambliss & Wilkins, New Framework, supra note 17, at 346-47 
(“Commentators attribute firms’ increasing reliance on in-house specialists to the increasing 
complexity of professional regulation and the increasing number of claims against 
lawyers.”). 
 26. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 578 (noting that 
participants in their focus groups “cited the increasing complexity of ethics and regulatory 
issues and the resulting need for individual specialization” as the reason that firms moved 
from committee-based ethics infrastructure to individual ethics specialists). 
 27. See, e.g., Peter R. Jarvis & Mark J. Fucile, The Inside Story, THE PROF. LAW. 22 (“in 
light of the increasing complexity of legal ethics issues, it makes no more sense to have 
everyone at the firm be an expert in legal ethics issues than it would to have everyone in a 
general practice firm be an expert in the details of ERISA or workers’ compensation law”).  
As one associate in another study noted, “ethics is talked about the first day and never talked 
about again.” Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and 
Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 826 
(1998). 
 28. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 579 (“[T]he use of 
specialists involves fewer partners in day-to-day-decisions and may serve to limit internal 
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that does ethics work for clients, the development of ethics expertise 
probably looks to junior lawyers like a specialization best avoided:29 it is 
largely of internal service,30 may be unlikely to generate increased 
compensation,31
Moreover, the availability of the ethics expert is uneven.  Larger firms 
tend to have a more developed “ethical infrastructure” than small firms.
 and is better deferred to more experienced and more senior 
colleagues. 
32  
Even within large firms that have committed to such infrastructure, the 
models of how it is structured and made available vary widely.33  And 
some—including Professor Chambliss—have expressed doubts that ethical 
infrastructure will truly be an effective resource for junior lawyers, 
particularly those concerned about the professional responsibility of 
partners.34
 
dialogue about ethical issues.”). 
 More important, the mere existence of specialists in firms—
available for consultation and advice—does not assure adequate attention 
to matters of professional responsibility because lawyers need to know 
 29. Noted one associate, “There is no . . . market for ethical practice.”  Gordon, supra 
note 11, at 716. 
 30. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 572 (noting the 
comment of one lawyer that he believed the “firm management” tasks he was undertaking as 
an ethics compliance lawyer were “ignored . . . at compensation time”); cf. id. at 573; see 
also Model Rule 1.8, infra note 46 (describing a firm that treats “in-house and outside work 
equivalently for compensation purposes”).  Other sources view this more frankly—one 
commentator notes that “in a setting where the Ethics Committee is known as the ‘No 
Business Committee,’ the routine ceremonies of business production can inadvertently 
convey the symbolic message that ethical consultation is just one step above napping at 
one’s desk.”  Suchman, supra note 22, at 864. 
 31. One such full-time ethics specialist commented that his arrangement had 
fundamentally altered his compensation arrangements: “I’m still a partner, but I have given 
up my rights to be compensated like a partner.”  Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, 
supra note 18, at 573.  The article goes on to note that uncompensated ethics specialists term 
the work a “burden,” while compensated specialists “tend to play a much broader and more 
proactive role in their firms.”  Id. at 574.  Suchman notes that none of the attorneys in the 
“Ethics Beyond the Rules” study “saw anything to be gained in their firm’s compensation 
and promotion process from exceptionally high ethical conduct.” Suchman, supra note 22, 
at 859 n.39 (emphasis added). 
 32. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 576; see generally Susan 
Saab Fortney, Ethics Counsel’s Role in Combating the “Ostrich” Tendency, 2002 THE 
PROF. LAW. 131.  Professor Fortney’s data, from Texas, reflect that the percentage of firms 
with formal ethics specialization increases as the firms get larger.  Id. at 136. 
 33. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 570-83. 
 34. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, Uncivil Litigation: Problematic Behavior in Large Law 
Firms, J. KANSAS B. ASS’N, Mar. 1997, at 24 (some lawyers in a study were skeptical about 
the value of ethics committees or advisers, “observing that associates would still be reluctant 
to raise concerns about the ethical practices of their superiors, and partners would be 
unlikely to know or pursue questions about the conduct of their peers”); see generally 
Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 18, at 572-75. 
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when they need to consult the experts.  One significant concern voiced by 
ethics specialists is that their colleagues are not attuned to the ethics issues 
that will inevitably arise in their practice and will not know enough to seek 
help.35  The experts, moreover, resist any suggestion that the advice be 
mandatory, viewing it as more palatable if the impetus for seeking advice 
comes from the lawyer.36
Not only are junior lawyers expected to work fast and develop expertise, 
the pressure of the large salaries they are paid means that the opportunities 
for collaborative work are reduced.
  Ethics awareness is far from intuitive; systems of 
ethical infrastructure are only likely to be as responsive as a sensitized 
population of lawyers can make them. 
37  These staffing pressures leave junior 
lawyers isolated, working in large part on their own, without adequate 
opportunities for mentorship,38 and lacking a venue for dialogue and 
engagement on ethics issues.39  One commentator describes them as “raised 
by wolves,” learning their ethics-related behavior by observing their 
colleagues in the wild.40
 
 35. Chambliss & Wilkins, Emerging Role, supra note 
 
18, at 587 (specialists “worry that 
some questions never come to their attention,” worry about how to get colleagues “to raise 
rather than ignore ethical questions,” and express concern that there is “‘a tremendous 
amount of ignorance about ethics’”). Noted one participant, “‘Ninety percent of the problem 
is getting people to spot the issues and pick up the phone and call you.’” Id. 
 36. Jarvis & Fucile, supra note 27, at 24 (“We believe that our advice will be best 
received if it is voluntarily sought.  We have, in fact, opposed efforts at the firm to make 
consultation with us mandatory in some or all situations that raise ethics issues.”). 
 37. Susan Zentay, After the Gold Rush, MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Oct. 12, 2004 
at 7 (“[S]alary increases ‘put an absurd amount of pressure on associates [and fostered a] 
notion of shut up and produce.’”). 
 38. Patrick Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, 
and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 739-40 (1998) 
(“Thus pressure to bill hours—pressure to ‘bill or be banished’—is necessarily pressure not 
to mentor.”).  In one study, forty-three percent of associates agreed with this statement: 
“Because of the pressure on partners to bill and generate business, partners in my firm do 
not provide the mentoring and training that I need and want.”  Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for 
Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of 
Billable Hour Requirements, 69 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 239, 283 (2000). 
 39. See Suchman, supra note 22, at 863; see also Molly Peckman, On the Care and 
Feeding of Associates, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 3, 2004, at 7 (“In fact, the need for 
mentoring new lawyers has never been greater, since BlackBerrys, e-mails, cell phones and 
facsimiles have destroyed most lawyer-to-lawyer contact . . . .  Gone are the days when new 
lawyers served internships or apprenticeships before beginning to practice and were 
welcomed into the profession by preceptors.  And while most prominent attorneys credit 
their success to mentors, many young lawyers wither for lack of such attention.”). 
 40. Suchman, supra note 22, at 869.  Comments another author, “In the absence of 
mentoring, the individual is often left to her own perceived self-interest and moral code and, 
faced with this climate, looks to rules—including those sanctioning the default norms of 
‘tough’ adversariness—or outside reference groups for guidance in making decisions.”  
Douglas N. Frenkel, Ethics Beyond the Rules—Questions and Possible Responses, 67 
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This phenomenon may be hard to perceive because firms view 
themselves as providing more training opportunities to their junior lawyers 
than they did in the past.  As was clear in the presentations at this 
conference, large law firms have broadly expanded their formal training 
activities, and give the appearance that younger lawyers are being taught 
more and trained more.  But this more formalized programming may be 
usurping for more informal opportunities for the hands-on participation and 
mentoring that may have been prevalent in the past.  Economic pressures 
mean that “[w]hat was once an easy, accepted part of big-firm practice has 
taken on a more studied and formal character.”41  While this seems 
satisfactory to firm managers, it may be less so to associates, who may not 
find that the formal programming meets their needs.42  Associates in one 
study complained in particular about inadequate ethics training, arguing 
“that formal ethical training tended to neglect day-to-day issues, and that it 
provided insufficient guidance in dealing with the sharp practices of 
opponents.”43
As junior lawyers are expected to move faster, and respond in real time 
to the needs of their clients and perhaps their supervisors as well, as they 
are being urged to specialize early and develop expertise, as they’re being 
encouraged to rely on an infrastructure of ethical consultation and support, 
as they work in an increasingly independent and sometimes isolated 
professional environment, what’s happening to the materials we’re 
expecting them to absorb to appreciate their ethical obligations?  They’re 
getting longer and more complex.
  Junior lawyers are doing more and therefore are expected to 
exercise judgment and discretion more often than in the past.  Yet they may 
be doing so with less in the way of knowledge and judgment. 
44
 
FORDHAM L. REV. 875, 880 (1998). 
 
 41. Sarat, supra note 27, at 825.  He continues: 
“[f]irms create Professional Responsibility Committees, institute lunches among 
partners to discuss targeted questions about professional conduct, and/or designate 
ombudsmen to whom questions about ethics and professionalism can be referred.  
Thus, if one just looked at the organization chart, one would think that firms were 
deeply invested in their socialization and social control functions.” 
Id. 
 42. In one study, associates “were much less satisfied with the current training regime 
than were partners.” Suchman, supra note 22, at 862. 
 43. Id. 
 44. I am not the first to note this.  See Wernz, supra note 14, at 187-88 (noting that “in 
the last decade the law of conflicts of interest for lawyers has become increasingly 
complicated,” that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers devotes 181 
pages to conflicts, and that Model Rule 1.7 has thirty-five comments). 
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III.  THE IMPERMEABILITY OF DOCTRINE 
The ABA=s first venture into the articulation of standards for ethics was 
the 1908 Canons of Ethics.  There were thirty-two of them, and they 
covered about nine pages of the ABA reports.45  Today’s ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct encompass fifty-seven rules, but that’s not 
really a fair count, because most of those rules encompass multiple 
subparts, incorporating many different rules.46 A fairer assessment of how 
dense these rules are might be understood by looking at the Comments, 
which purport to provide helpful interpretive guidance for the rules.47
One place to look for evidence that these rules have gotten too dense and 
complex to be relevant to the average lawyer is to consider whether 
members of the bar have participated in commenting on proposed rule 
changes.  One might hypothesize that as the rules become denser and more 
complex, ordinary practitioners participate less in the process of reviewing 
and commenting on proposed changes.
  The 
current version of the Model Rules includes 444 comments. 
48
 
 45. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year 
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, n.2 (2004) (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING 575-84 (1908)).  Earlier approaches were briefer still; 
David Dudley Field, the author of New York’s Field Code, offered a series of eight statutory 
duties which were adopted in several states.  See id. at 1423-25 & n.278.  David Hoffman’s 
“Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment” numbered fifty duties.  DAVID 
HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-775 (1836).  Hoffman’s fiftieth resolution was 
to urge lawyers to reread these fifty resolutions twice a year.  See id. at 775. 
  Recent efforts by various 
jurisdictions to adopt various portions of the post-Ethics 2000 revisions to 
the Model Rules create an opportunity to consider that hypothesis.  For the 
most part, jurisdictions that have completed the process of making such 
 46. For example, Model Rule 1.8, which deals with a series of miscellaneous conflict-
of-interest rules, actually encompasses eleven distinct rules (denominated 1.8(a)-(k)); Model 
Rule 3.4 has six distinct subparts, but actually includes more than six separate rules. 
 47. The Preamble includes twenty-one comments. Below is a list of each of the current 
Model Rules, followed by the number of comments associated with each rule: 
Rule 1.0: 10; Rule 1.1: 6; Rule 1.2: 13; Rule 1.3: 5; Rule 1.4: 7; Rule 1.5: 9; Rule 
1.6: 18; Rule 1.7: 35; Rule 1.8: 20; Rule 1.9: 9; Rule 1.10: 8; Rule 1.11: 10; Rule 
1.12: 5; Rule 1.13: 14; Rule 1.14:9; Rule 1.15: 6; Rule 1.16:9; Rule 1.17: 15; Rule 
1.18: 9; Rule 2.1: 5; Rule 2.3: 6; Rule 2.4: 5; Rule 3.1: 3; Rule 3.2: 1; Rule 3.3: 
15; Rule 3.4: 4; Rule 3.5: 5; Rule 3.6: 8; Rule 3.7: 7; Rule 3.8: 6; Rule 3.9: 3; Rule 
4.1: 3; Rule 4.2: 9; Rule 4.3: 2; Rule 4.4: 3; Rule 5.1: 8; Rule 5.2: 2; Rule 5.3: 2; 
Rule 5.4: 2; Rule 5.5: 21; Rule 5.6: 3; Rule 5.7: 11; Rule 6.1: 12; Rule 6.2: 3; Rule 
6.3: 2; Rule 6.4: 1; Rule 7.1: 4; Rule 7.2: 8; Rule 7.3: 8; Rule 7.4: 3; Rule 7.5: 2; 
Rule 7.6: 6; Rule 8.1: 3; Rule 8.2: 3; Rule 8.3: 5; Rule 8.4: 5; Rule 8.5: 7. 
 48. The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent promulgation of a new version of the ethics rules 
produced a draft of about two-hundred single-spaced pages.  As one might imagine, few 
practitioners undertook the lengthy process of reviewing those pages when comments were 
solicited by our Supreme Court.  See infra note 49. 
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changes note scant comment from members of the bar on these proposed 
changes.49  By contrast, the American Bar Association’s solicitation of 
comments on a draft of the 1908 rules drew more than one thousand letters 
of comment.50
 
 49. A telephonic survey of jurisdictions making recent changes to their ethics rules in 
response to Ethics 2000 reflected that few comments on those changes were received from 
members of the bar.  Telephone Survey conducted by Justin McCarty, Research Assistant, 
University of Iowa Law School, Iowa City, Iowa (August 2005) (on file with the author).  
Delaware reported fewer than two dozen comments, Indiana approximately twenty-five, and 
Montana “just a handful.”  Id. New Jersey noted “a dozen or so,” but they came from bar 
associations rather than individual lawyers.  Id.  North Carolina reported fewer than fifty 
(the precise number was twenty-three), Oregon reported “only a handful,” Pennsylvania 
received “fewer than a dozen” comments, and South Dakota reported receiving none.  Three 
states indicated more significant comment on recent changes; Arizona reported “hundreds” 
of comments; and Louisiana and Maryland reported “a fair number.”   Id.  
 
  The Maryland comments take up eighty-four pages of the final report.  The multiple 
comments, when analyzed, came from only twenty-three commenters.  See REPORT OF THE 
SELECT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND TO STUDY THE 
ETHICS 2000 AMENDMENTS TO THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Dec. 
16, 2003) [hereinafter Maryland Report], available at 
www.courts.state.md.us/lawyersropc_finalrept03.pdf.The breakdown of those comments is 
edifying.  One came from bar counsel, six from representatives of professional 
organizations, two from law school faculty members, and four from bar associations.  Id.  
Only ten came from individual lawyers.  Of those, one came from members of a firm ethics 
committee and one from a lawyer in his capacity as the attorney for a lawyer-client in a 
disciplinary proceeding.  Id. 
  The North Carolina experience was almost eerily similar.  The North Carolina State 
Bar received twenty-three comments in response to its draft revisions to the state legal ethics 
rules prepared in light of Ethics 2000.  2003-2004 Letters of Comment on Proposed 
Changes to the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct (on file with author).  Of the 
twenty-three, one came from a judge, four came from lawyers speaking on behalf of 
professional organizations, one came from a lawyer speaking on behalf of a client, and three 
came from the same U.S. attorney.  Id. Of the remaining fourteen comments, ten were e-
mails, one reporting a typo, and four consisted of eight lines or less.  Id. 
  The results were even more striking in Iowa.  When the Iowa Supreme Court 
solicited comments on its recent and significant revisions to the state’s ethics rules, the 
Court received nineteen comments.  Public Comments Received by Clerk in the Matter of 
the Proposed Adoption of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct (on file with author).  
One was from the Drafting Committee appointed by the Supreme Court to propose revisions 
and one was from the Reporter of that committee.  Id.  Two comments were from 
government departments, three from professional organizations, and one from a state task 
force, one from Legal Aid and one from a law firm. Id.  Two comments appeared to be from 
individuals who are not lawyers. There were seven comments from individual lawyers. 
 Despite the fact that the revisions proposed significant changes to, inter alia, the rules on 
confidentiality (including the novel institution of a mandatory disclosure provision) and on 
multijurisdictional practice, few lawyers appeared to note or comment upon those changes.  
Id.   
  More and more systematic research would certainly be appropriate, but the 
conclusion that the average practitioner has little interest in the process of rule revision 
seems borne out by this experience. 
 50. See Andrews, supra note 45, at 1440. 
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The density of these rules has the potential to have a significant 
impact.51  The theory of the rules is no longer, as perhaps it was with the 
early ethics codes, that lawyers would review them regularly and remind 
themselves of the principles governing the lawyer’s role. 52
Professor Chambliss accuses me of a misplaced nostalgia for a time that 
never was, when individual lawyers thoroughly understood the ethics rules 
and attended conscientiously to their obligations under them.  Her criticism 
is fairly taken; such a golden age of individual responsibility probably 
never existed.  But to say that is not to abandon the notion that individual 
awareness and sensitization to the issues presented by the governing 
principles remains important.  For a lawyer previously unfamiliar with the 
fifty-seven Model Rules and their 444 comments.  Reviewing them would 
require a lengthy period of intense study.
  That cheerful 
naivete of earlier eras—that a single, relatively simple, code of behavior 
would be enough to advise lawyers of their ethical obligations—is gone.  
But no concept of how the average lawyer should become or remain 
familiar with the principles of professional responsibility has replaced it. 
53  Such study, moreover, would 
not seem to be what an unschooled reader was looking for.  It would not be 
a general reminder of lawyerly principles, but rather like a research 
exercise, more appropriate for a specialist.54
 
 51. One author argues that the effect of the repeated redrafting of the rules of lawyer 
behavior is “to maximize the number of lawyers who know and follow the minimum rules 
of the profession,” or “to make it easier to follow the minimum standards.”  Benjamin H. 
Barton, The ABA, The Rules and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call 
for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
411, 421 (2005).  The increased complexity of the Model Rules suggests that, if this is the 
goal of what Professor Barton terms the “minimalist” project, it is not particularly effective. 
 
One comment received by the North Carolina State Bar during its notice and comment 
period is pertinent here: “I am as I have been for several years, truly disturbed that we have 
50 pages of ethics.  To my mind, a lawyer has no ability to determine what is ethical, all is 
left up to a small group who, essentially, sit on a throne in a distant city to make that 
judgment . . . .  Can’t you people come up with shorter rules?  How in the world can you 
expect a lawyer to know and understand pages of small typed pages of rules.”  Letter from 
Richard L. Griffin to Alice Neece Mine, Assistant Executive Director, The North Carolina 
State Bar (Sept. 30, 2002)(on file with author). 
 52. Hoffman’s fiftieth Resolution in Regard to Professional Deportment was that 
lawyers should read the first forty-nine twice a year during their professional lives.  See 
supra note 45. 
 53. Perhaps this is why the many lawyers in one study indicated no knowledge of 
changes to their state professional responsibility rules.  See Levin, supra note 16, at 369-70 
(lawyers in her study “freely admitted that they did not keep up-to-date” on the state ethics 
code “and that they had not consulted it since law school”). 
 54. I note parenthetically that the mechanism of rules revision may not make changes 
easily accessible to members of the practicing bar. Techniques like underlining proposed 
changes, preparing executive summaries, and creating easily accessible and readable online 
documents might facilitate broader participation in rule revision.  Note one attorney’s 
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Many of these rules, moreover, are irrelevant to large areas of the 
practice; while all lawyers may be interested in the rules regarding 
confidentiality, client loyalty, or competence, rules regarding the special 
obligations of prosecutors or the management of pretrial publicity may be 
of more limited interest. 
The rules are long because legal ethics issues are complex.55  But we 
often boil complex issues down to simpler, though perhaps less clear and 
less precise rules.56
One might ask whether the professionalization of ethics is exacerbated 
by our existing rules, which fail to distinguish between the complex and 
specialized guidance needed for the ethics expert and the general principles 
that should guide every lawyer.  One might conclude from this that there 
are no such immutable principles, that all ethics issues are technical issues 
to be attended to by the experts, and that the ordinary practitioner need not 
trouble himself about them very much.
  The command that “thou shalt not kill” does not take 
account of the need for self-defense or the exigencies of war, but it 
articulates a pretty good basic principle for governing conduct.  It is not the 
only text available; an expert has access to tools that can facilitate a more 
complete exegesis in the case of a more complex or nuanced problem.  
Ordinarily, however, we do not assume that the expert and the man on the 
street must be guided by identical texts.  The general principle can be relied 
upon to govern most people most of the time. 
57
 
comment on Maryland’s proposed changes: 
  A complex and professionalized 
ethics system, while it provides resources for lawyers in an environment 
where there is ethics infrastructure, may provide little for those who are 
not.  In one study, when asked how they resolved ethical dilemmas, 
“I am writing to suggest that the process of viewing proposed changes would be 
a[sic] 1,000 times easier if the Committee adopted a form . . . to clearly 
differential [sic] the current from the proposed.  I am not sure how arduous a task 
it will be to try to compare the two.  Also, I would suggest that the Committee 
publish only the changed Rule section and any altered or added Comment(s).  The 
document will be much more handleable and easier to compare.” 
Maryland Report, supra note 49, at 406. 
 55. Wernz, supra note 14, at 182, 186 (explaining that  “Morality for lawyers, especially 
advocates, is, in special ways, deep, complicated and inherently ambiguous,” and “[E]thics 
for lawyers, as opposed to other professions and occupations, is an especially knotty and 
ambiguous challenge.”). 
 56. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the law’s 
“successful operation over vast areas of social life depends on a widely diffused capacity to 
recognize particular acts, things, and circumstances as instances of the general classification 
which the law makes”). 
 57. See Wernz, supra note 14, at 187 (“Lawyers in large firms are faced with an 
important, but hidden, ethical issue—the temptation to think that their practices do not 
involve moral issues.”). 
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respondents answered that they “mostly fly by the seat of their pants.”58
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
What prescription can we take from this for training our young lawyers?  
I offer three: focus on specialty-specific ethics education, acknowledge the 
contribution of the ethics specialists, and (this is a much more complex 
proposition) draft our ethics rules differently. 
A.  Specialty-Specific Ethics Training 
First, specialty-specific ethics education is important.  It retains its 
relevance even for a specialization-driven practice; education about who 
the client is in an estate planning practice, or what Sarbanes-Oxley requires 
in a corporate practice, or how litigators should deal with email 
communications, provides training directly relevant to the lawyers’ current 
practice.  It also narrows somewhat the breadth of what must be 
understood.  Rather than suggesting that every lawyer must master a 
complex body of what appears, to some, to be irrelevant doctrine, such 
training makes the concepts relevant to a particular practice more 
accessible and gives lawyers more confidence that they can reason 
knowledgeably and appropriately in this area.59
B.  Valuing the Ethics Specialist 
  Of course, there are limits 
to the categorization of ethics; there are many areas we can imagine, from 
client confidentiality to conflicts of interest, where general education is still 
critical. 
If the “ethical infrastructure” of law firms is to play a significant role in 
helping young lawyers to recognize the importance of professional 
responsibility to their practices, then the ethics specialists must be 
acknowledged as full and valued contributors to the practice.  Actions 
speak louder than words; if ethics expertise is a backwater for the practice, 
that will signal to junior lawyers that it is an area that should be avoided.  
 
 58. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to Be a Human Being and a 
Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation With Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 
105 W. VA. L. REV. 495, 512 & n.73 (2003). 
 59. Enhanced specialty-specific ethics training would be a welcome contribution; noted 
one senior associate in a study, “it is very hard, in my opinion, to find ABA ethics classes 
that actually speak to somebody who faces the dilemmas that I face.  For example, I am a 
mid-level associate. I have just started now dealing with expert witnesses . . . .  It would be 
really useful to me if somebody were to give a seminar on the ethical dilemmas that I might 
face and how to deal with those, but the ABA and the [State Bar Association] don’t seem to 
have that, and it’s something my firm is not providing.”  Suchman, supra note 22, at 862. 
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Adequate compensation, institutional respect, and appropriate authority for 
the ethics specialist will reflect law firms’ intention to treat such 
specializations as valuable and productive. 
C.  Revisit the Rules 
Many scholars have critiqued the character of the Model Rules, arguing 
that they are legalistic rather than aspirational, impose a minimalist rather 
than lofty standard for lawyer conduct, and fail to create adequate 
opportunity for the lawyer’s exercise of her own ethical judgment.  My 
claim here is much more modest: when rules are too long and complex, 
they lose their pertinence for lawyers who are not ethics specialists.  The 
need to write rules which provide examples and analyses of every possible 
issue or concern has made it more and more difficult for practitioners to 
independently utilize ethics resources; they may come to think of ethics as 
a specialty area, where they are incompetent to render our own decisions 
and must consult an expert.  While ethics consultation is a lucrative 
business for many, we should be profoundly concerned if the 
professionalization of ethics results in less individual connection to 
professional responsibility. 
We have two alternatives in thinking about this problem.  First, we could 
move to a shorter and simpler rules model, perhaps one which separates the 
comments from the text of the Model Rules and treats them instead as 
advisory committee notes.  The rules, standing alone, would be a much 
more manageable document for lawyers to digest, while the comments 
would remain available to anyone seeking further guidance on a particular 
issue. 
While this would be a functional solution, it would not be an optimal 
one, because the rules alone reflect a floor, not a ceiling.  Encouraging 
lawyers to look to the disciplinary rules alone to guide their conduct as 
lawyers is, in a larger sense, a bit like encouraging citizens to use state 
penal codes to govern their behavior.  They’ll err on the side of lawful 
conduct, but not by much.  Our goal is somewhat loftier, perhaps embodied 
in Professor Sarat’s view that: 
At the heart of this idea of lawyer professionalism is a vision of autonomy 
and ethical practice, of civility and decorum in the daily life of lawyers, 
and of lawyers committed to and regulated by a set of principles encoded 
in the profession’s Model Rules.  The image of lawyer as statesman looms 
large as the unspoken model to which lawyers should aspire.  In this 
image, lawyers’ ethics go beyond strict adherence to professional rules.  
Rather, they reflect the dictates of practical wisdom, a capacious sense of 
the public interest, and a judicious ability to see and reconcile the client=s 
long-term interest with the best interest of both law and the society it 
CHRISTENSEN_RAYMOND 2/3/2011  10:10 PM 
2005 PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ETHICS 117 
serves.60
Besides, lawyers already tend to perceive ethical issues as purely legal 
issues—rules to be “lawyered,” subject to the analysis, interpretation and 
hair-splitting that many lawyers view as their obligation when serving the 
interests of a client.
 
61 Only breaches of the disciplinary rules are ethically 
unacceptable.62  And the rules are perceived as “easy” because, to the non-
ethics expert, “the rules are mostly clear.”63  One scholar writes, “As long 
as their behavior breaks none of the canons of professional responsibility, 
respondents are absolved of guilt.  One respondent dislikes representing 
toxic polluters, but following the principle of zealous advocacy, he reports 
that; ‘I just close my eyes and do it.’”64  The rules are not intended to be a 
replacement for thinking ethically, but such comments and practices might 
suggest they are.  Moreover, disciplinary rules are unlikely to matter much 
to large-firm lawyers.  “They’re rarely subjected to discipline for rule 
violations the consequences of unethical conduct for lawyers in large firms 
tend to be internal rather than external.”65
Instead, perhaps we need a new document—a straightforward expression 





 60. Sarat, supra note 
  But a document that would be easily 
reviewable by every practicing lawyer, twice a year, one which would 
create a shared set of norms acknowledged and reinforced even by those 
27, at 816. 
 61. See Barton, supra note 1, at 453-54 (arguing that the “black letter” format of the 
rules “trigger[s] a particular heuristic in lawyers: we are trained to carefully read and 
analyse rules to find (as precisely as possible) the boundary between legal and illegal 
behavior . . . .  When lawyers apply this boundary seeking process to issues of legal ethics 
the technical legal question (what am I allowed to do?) frequently eclipses the broader moral 
question (what should I do?).”). 
 62. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 710 (1998) (noting based on a series of interviews 
with large-firm lawyers that “[e]thically inappropriate behavior (in the standard take) is 
defined narrowly as a violation of the rules”). 
 63. Id. at 711.  Gordon indicates that this is the first layer, which he refers to as the 
“standard take” on legal ethics issues in large law firms, and reflects a considerably more 
complex and nuanced perception in subsequent discussion.  See id. at 712. 
 64. Granfield & Koenig, supra note 58, at 514. 
 65. See Frenkel, supra note 40, at 877 (individual discipline “tends to be rather private, 
rare in the segment of the bar [large private firms] we studied, limited by the scarce 
resources of enforcement offices and confined to after-the-fact policing of conduct that has 
clearly crossed the line”). 
 66. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, 
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 236 
(1993) (noting that “[t]o the extent the professional codes appropriately rest on the 
assumption that lawyers will respond to guidance, clear rules and punishment for violation 
of those rules are not always necessary to produce desirable conduct”). 
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lawyers too busy to spend much time on ethics, would be a valuable start.67
 
  
Such an approach would play some role in “de-professionalizing” ethics 
and reminding each lawyer of her obligation to be an ethical practitioner. 
 
 67. Professor Gordon notes the need to “reinvigorate” professional ideals of obligations 
to the framework of justice.  As he notes, “successful systems of norms depend on shared 
understandings and informal sanctions of communities.  Externally imposed rules and 
sanctions of regulatory regimes can reinforce, but cannot substitute, for such informal norms 
and sanctions.”  Gordon, supra note 11, at 737. 
